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Summary findings
Recent  developments  in trade theory - the result of  The normative  prescriptions  that arise  from the new
applying  models  that embody  imperfect  competition  and  trade theory are also criticized  in terms of political
increasing  returns  to scale  - suggest  an activist  role for  economy  issues:  the potential  for foreign  retaliation,
government  in trade policy  and threaten to undermine  inefficient  government  intervention,  special  interests'
the case for trade liberalization.  capture of policy,  the prob!em  of moral  hazard,  and
But  the new modelling  of international  trade lacks  possibly  inimical  redistributive  effects.
theoretical  robustness.  It is particularly  sensitive  to  The limits  of the new trade theory are particularly
assumptions  about competitive  behavior  and the number  acute  for developing  countries  because  of their small
of firms.  Economists'  criticism  also  focuses  on the size  of  economies,  their limited  ability  to shift  profits,  the nature
the excess  profits  that oligopolistic  firms are alleged  to  of their trade, and the greater  chance  for special  interests
earn,  the partial equilibri-'m  nature  of the analysis,  and  to capture  trade policy. Paradoxically,  empirical  work
the identification  of the market  failure  and the choice  of  has shown  that the gains  from trade are much bigger
instrument.  under imperfectly  competitive  markets  which actually
strengthens  the case  for trade liberalization.
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understand  the application  of recent  trade-theoretic  developments  to developing  countries.  Copies  of  the paper  are available  free
from the  World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Asad  Alam,  room  D8-056,  extension  87380
(28  pages).  March  1994.
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While developing  countries  are reforming  their trade regimes  in order to achieve  neutrality,  some
developed  countries,  particularly  the United  States,  are facing  demands  for departing  from neutral  trade
policies as a means  to improving  national  welfare. Such demands  are derived, in good measure, from
recent developments  in  trade theory, arising from the application of models embodying imperfect
competition  and increasing  returns  to scale, which  suggest  an activist  role for government  in trade policy.
This leads to the concern that developing  countries  may actually  revert to their earlier dirigiste
policies  if (a) they  perceive  that trade intervention  by the developed  countries  is of a beggar-thy-neighbor
variety which will shift national welfare from the developing to the developed countries, or, (b) the
developing countries actually find in these theoretical developments  a  new rationale for their own
intervention. Krugman  has popularized  the nomenclature  of a 'new trade theory' for these  trade-theoretic
developments  on the grounds that these "new models  open the possibility  that govermnent  intervention
in trade... may under some circumstances  be in the national  interest after all".'
In the standard  neoclassical  trade theory, based on competive models,  trade policy activism  is
advocated  only as a means to correcting  for trade distortions - that is, those distortions which relate
directly to, or arise from, international  trade.  These trade distortions  can be either endogenous  or
1/  Krugman  1987,  pp.  131-32.  But  Bhagwad  (1989)  has  argued  that  such  an assertion  ignores  the  significant  developmeo
in  the  theory  of  commercial  policy  during  the 1960s  and  the 1970s  which  addressed  numerous  market  failures  and  noneconomic
objectives  and  developed  rational  economic  criteria  for govermnent  intervention,  including  trade  intervention,  and,  therefore,
is not unique  in  providing  a rationale  for  trade  intervention,  as the  prefix  'new' suggests.
2/  Bhagwati  (1971)  characterizes  distortions  as any  divergence  from  the equality  of  the domestic te of substintion  in
consumption  with  the domestic  rate  of transformation  in  production  and  the foreign  rate  of transformation  through  foreign  wad.
or as  the  failure  of the economy  to achieve  aggregate  producdon  efficiency  in the  sense  of the  non-operation  of the  economy
on  the  efficient,  full  employment  production  possibility  frontier.2
policy-imposed. 3 Endogenous  trade distortions  are systemic to the economy and arise from market
failures in trading activity.  For instance, some exports may not take place due to externalities in
exporting  which  may not be fully  appropriable  to the exporter. Such  externalities,  normally  of a positive
nature (and therefore requiring export  promonon), may arise from the opening  of foreign markets, the
establishment  of national and product quality reputation,  the learning of ways of operating in foreign
markets, and the gaining  of access  to goods  and services in foreign  countries. Exports may also fail to
exist because of imperfect  capital markets. This may be because  export activities  are inherently  risky
since the ultimate payment liability lies with a foreign entity and since there are risks associated  with
currency  fluctuations  and with operating  in foreign  markets. Other forms  of endogenous  distortions  arise
when, for instance, price-taking  consumers  and producers  do not perceive  a country's market power in
its foreign trade, or when increasing returns to scale in production lead to a non-convexity  of the
production  possibility  frontier.
Policy-imposed  trade distortions  arise when trade interventions  themselves  lead to a movement
away from Pareto optimality. Such  distortions  are quite common  in international  trade as, for instance,
the distortions arising from import protection, foreign exchange restrictions, and export taxes, all of
which create a bias against exports (and in favor of imports). When  policymakers  are either unwilling
or unable to correct these distortions,  then only is government  intervention  warranted  to offset the bias
and to bring about a neutrality  of incentives  between exports and import-substitutes  characterized  by a
parity between  the effective  exchange  rates  for exports and imports. This would then allow  trade to take
place on the basis of comparative  advantage  and improve  economic  welfare.
But the new trade theory  provides instances  where even in the absence  of such distortions,  trade
3/  The  characterization  of distonions  as  endogenous  or policy-imposed  originates  in Bhagwati  (1971).3
intervention  is welfare-improving. In view of the importance  of this policy implication,  this pape
critically  reviews  the arguments  of the new trade theory, and evaluates  their relevance  for the developing
countries' trade policies in the light of both the theoretical  and the empirical  evidence.
B.  THE NEW TRADE THEORY
The new trade theory has forwarded  two arguments  for trade intervention  - the profit-shifting
argument  (or the strategic  trade argument)  and the externalities  argument. 4 The profit-shifting  argument
builds on the notion  that international  competition  in many  markets  is oligopolistic  in nature. Since  a key
characteristic  of oligopolistic  competition  is that the price charged for a good exceeds  the marginal  cost
of production,  countries  importing  such a good  pay rents to the exporting  firm.  This provides  a role for
government  intervention  since by altering  the set of credible  actions, the government  can shift production
and the associated rents to domestic firms and thereby increase national welfare.  Examples  of such
markets cited in the literature are the markets  for high-technology  goods like semiconductors,  aircraft,
and biotechnology  products,
The externalities  argument  says  that certain  industries  or firms that  generate  positive  externalities,
which  are not fully appropriable,  will  not grow to their social  optimum  and, therefore, need government
promotion.  While this has long been advanced as an argument for government intervention and
protection,  Krugman  (1987)  argues  that the new trade theory "has  given  at least the appearance  of greater
concreteness to the theoretical case for government intervention to promote external benefits...  .In
traditional  international  trade models with their reliance  on perfect competition...externalities  resulting
from incomplete  appropriability  could not be explicitly  recognized,  because  the knowledge  investment
41  Krugman  (1987)4
by firms that is the source of the spillover  could  not be fitted in.... [Therefore]  external  economies  seemed
abstract  ....Once increasing returns and imperfect  competition  are seen as the normn,  this problem of
abstractness  is reduced. The dynamnic  scale economies  associated  with investment  in knowledge  are just
another reason for the imperfection  of competition  that has already  been accepted  as the norm. External
economies can now be  identified with incomplete appropriability of the  results of  R&D, which
immediately  suggests  that they are most likely  to be found  in industries  where R&D is an especially  large
part of firms' costs".  The argument  is that such industries  are typically  the knowledge-intensive,  high-
technology  industries  which should, therefore, be targeted for support. 5 But the empirical evidence  on
this is very sparse and, as Bhagwati  (1993) has argued, "these  discrepancies  [between  social  and private
returns from R&D] are so different across industries,  and so difficult to predict, that selecting  any one
industry, or any one bunch of industries.  for prior support is nothing  more than an act of faith.  The
empirical  basis for such a selection  is shaky indeed".
There is also a counter  argument  to the inappropriability  of R&D  in the protection  of R&D results
through  rules-based  trade by means  of patent  protection  and support  of intellectual  property rights  through
international  negotiations,  as in the Uruguay  Round.  Moreover, the use of trade instruments,  such as
export subsidies, to appropriate  externalities  is not a first-best  solution as externalities  are a domestic
distortion requiring  the use of domestic  instruments. The economnic  literature  on distortions  is very clear
in recommending  that the optimal  policy  intervention  in such instances  is an R&D or production  subsidy.
An export subsidy  would have been  justified orlly  when the externalities  arise from the exporting  activity
itself and not from production  per se.  In such a case, the externality would have been trade-related
requiring  a trade instrument. The incorporation  of the externalities  argument  in the literature  on the new
5/  See, for instance.  Tyson (1992).5
trade theory reflects the widespread  conceptual  confusion  between  industrial  and trade policy.'  In what
follows, we shall, therefore, only focus on the profit-shifting  argument  which really is the only trade-
policy relevant  argument.
I.  The Profit-Shlfti  Amsment
There are three variants of the profit-shifting  argument.  In its simplest form, the argument
rationalizes  the use of a tariff to extract  the rents that a foreign  oligopolistic  finn might be enjoying  under
potential  entry.'  In the absence of any potential  entry, a tariff would only widen the wedge between
domestic  and foreign prices and be a welfare-worsening  proposition. But the threat of potential  entry of
domestic  finns constrains  the pricing  response  of foreign  firms and induces  them to pursue a strategy of
deterring  such entry by absorbing  the tariff to some extent. As long as the tariff is absorbed, even ii only
partly, the rise in prices will be less than  the tariff so that the loss in consumer  surplus can be more than
compensated  by the collection  in tariff revenues. In the special case when the foreign firm absorbs  the
tariff wholly, the rent will have been extracted  without  any additional  distortion. The policy result  here
is identical  to the exploitation  of monopsony  power by an importer through an imrpot tax (the optimal
tariff argument) which is well analyzed and documented in the  literature on commercial policy.
However, there is a significant  qualitative  difference  - the rent extraction  argtunent does not require a
country  to be 'large' in the conventional  sense  of being  able to affect its terms of trade, as in the optimal
6/  Industrial  policy refers to the use of domeaic po!ki  inmnents  like production,  consutmptions.  sales, fator, and
corporate  taxes and subsidies  and quantitative  restraints  on production  wo  alter the composition  of domestic industrial  output.
Trade policy,  however,  refers to the use of trade (orforeign)  polcy  ik0rtlntr  like import  and export tariffs. subsdies, and
quotas,  voluntay export  restraints,  voluntary  import  expansions,  and other instumtents  to alter the composition  and volume  of
trade. The  confusion  arises  because  industriai  policy  by altering  the composition  of domestic  output  can also consequendy  alter
the composition  of trade.  Simibarly,  trade policy  in  altering  the composition  of tade may  also alter the composition  of domestic
output. The litmus  test for distinction  between  the two. therefore,  has to be the instruments  that are used and not where the
indirect  effects  may fall.
7/  Brander  and Spencer  (1981)6
tariff argument; even a small country  can use an import  tariff to improve  its national  welfare  when there
are foreign  oligopolistic  suppliers in the domestic  market, an outcome not possible in the optimal  tariff
case.
The second variant of the profit-shifting  argument  is to provide a subsidy  to the domestic  firm
engaged in a Coumot duopoly game with a foreign  competitor  in a third market.1 The assumption  of
a third market  enables  the discussion  of national  gain  to be conducted  in terms of producer  surplus  alone.
It is in the nature of a Cournot game that the equilibrium  output level, given  by the intersection  of the
two firms' rcaction curves, is nationally suboptimal  although  jointly optimal.  A subsidy, therefore,
enhances  national  welfare by lowering  the mnarginal  cost to the domestic  firm, thereby commnitting  it to
a higher  reaction  curve. This enables  the firm  to capture  a larger foreign  market-share,  increase  domestic
profits, and reduce foreign  profits. National  welfare, net of the subsidy, increases  as the profit is higher,
the subsidy itself being  just a transfer payment. Crucial to this argument is the notion that the subsidy
credibly  commits the domestic  firm to an aggressive  market  strategy  and thereby  forces its foreign  rival
to adapt accordingly.
This analysis can be readily understood in the context of the neoclassical  trade theory.  As
Deardorff  and Stern (1987)  have pointed  out, "there is in a sense a distortion  here, each firm perceiving
that the benefit from expanding  exports will be less than it in fact will be" resulting in a divergence
between  the private and social marginal  revenue  curves. In this particular  instance, the private marginal
revenue  curve lies below the social marginal  revenue  curve and hence, the volume of exports, given  by
the intersection  of the private marginal  revenue  curve and the private marginal  cost curve, is suboptimal.
Hence, the need for export expansion. Such a divergence  arises from the highly unrealistic Cournot
8/  Brander  and  Spencer  (1985)7
assumption  on account of which each firmn  expect's the other firm's output to be independent  of its own
even  though  the model  suggests  that there is a negative  relationship  between  the two. The lack  of perfect
information  regarding the foreign producer's response is the actual distortion here which warrants
government  intervention. But a subsidy,  while  it leads to a superior  outcome, is not a first-best  solution.
The theory of distortions, as propounded by Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan  (1969) and Bhagwati
(1971). would suggest  that the first-best  policy here would  be to provide  more market information  to the
domestic producer presuming, of course, even if somewhat  ambitiously,  that governments  have more
information  than private producers regarding  private markets.
The third variant of the profit-shifting  argument is a novel extension of the infant industry
argument. The argument is that a protected  home  market provides a firm characterized  by economies
of scale, internal  to the firm, an advantage  in scale  over foreign  producers, and enables it to raise market
shares in domestic  and foreign  unprotected  markets.'  This shifts profits from foreign  to domestic  firns
and thereby increases  domestic  welfare  at the expense  of foreign  welfare.
In the neoclassical  paradigm, economies  of scale originating  in the firm are not admissible  for
protection,  per se, as such economies  eventually  lead to profits upon the maturity  of the firm which can
be used to pay off loans incurred  for investments  during the growth period. But in Krugman's  example,
the economies  of scale cannot be internalized  by the firm as the firm is constrained  by the size of its
market share.  The economies  of scale in Krugman's model are static since the average cost of output
decreases  as the firm's scale of output, at a given point of time, increases. In other words, the firm is
operating  on the downward  sloping segment  of the standard  U-shaped  average cost curve.
9/  Krugman  (1984)8
Krugman's modelling of the static economies  of scale as an independent  rationale for infant-
industry protection Is novel since it is the dynamic  economies  of scale which are at the heart of thc
standard infant-industry  argument based on capital market Imperfections  and externalities  (or lack of
appropriability). In these dynamic  economies, the average cost falls as the length of time over which
output  is produced  increases. Time is of the essence  here as it is only over time that learning  takes  place.
While dynamic economies  may indeed  depend  on static economits as, for example, when leaniing is a
fhnction not only of time but also of the size of the market, and may, therefore, rise with a firm's
cumulanve output (i.e. total output over time), static economies of scale, by themselves, are not a
sufficient  basis for making an infant-industry  case.  '0 But in making these static economies  as a basis
for protection, Krugman extends import-substitution  from domestic to  foreign shores and thereby
translates  temporary import  protection  into  an export  promotion  mechanism. Crucial to Krugman's  idea,
however, is the assumption  that the domestic  market is large enough to facilitate the realization  of the
presumed  economnies  of scale.
Corden (1990) has pointed  out that the assumption  of a Coumot-oligopoly  is not essential  to the
argument  that import  protection  can be export  promoting. I,e cites the work of Pursell and Snape (1973)
who have shown that when there is a domestic  monopolist  characterized  by increasing  returns to scale
who faces given world prices (i.e. small country  assumption),  then a tariff could make a discriminating
monopoly  possible allowing prices at home to be raised and those abroad to be lowered, and thus
promoting  exports (although  this wouid not be socially  optimal).
Thus,  while some of  the  ideas underlying profit-shifting can well be  derived from  the
10/  See  Corden (1974, chapter 9) for an excellent  exposition  on this theme.  He calls the argument  for infant industry
protection  based  on static economies  of scale 'dtc pseudo-infant  industry  argument". See also Grubel  (1966)  for more on the
economies  of scale argument.9
conventional  body  of trade theory, the profit-shifting  arguments  do provide  at least  two new rationale  for
govermnent intervention  in an interesting  and elegant framework.  Pirst, Brande: and Spencer's rent
extraction  argument  provides  an argument  for the use of an import  tariff by a small couairy to improve
its national welfare when there are foreign oligopolistic  suppliers in the domestic market.  Seeond,
Krugrnan's import-protection-as-export-promotion  argunent presents static economies of scale as an
independent  rationale for infant-industry  protection.  But, as we see below, all of the profit-shifting
arguments  are faced with strong and potent  criticism.
II.  Crtcsms of the ProfiShifti.  Arument
Criticismns  of the profit-shifting  argument  have been levelled  on both economic  and political
economy  grounds. The economic  criticisms  emanate  from the sensitivity  of the model to assumptions
made  about  competitive  behavior  and the ntumber  of firms, the size  of the excess profits that oligopolistic
finrms  are alleged to earn, the partial equilibrium  nature of the analysis, and the identification  of the
distortion  and the choice  of instrument. The political  economy  arguments  are largely based  on the limited
scope for  strategic trade policy in  view oi  potential foreign retaliation, inefficient government
intervention, capture of policy by special interests, moral hazard problem, and possib!e iniimical
redistributive  effects.
1.  The economic critique
(a)  Sensitivity  to Assumptioiis  about  Comoetitive  Behavior
Eaton and Grossman  (1986), in a very damaging  criticism, succinctly  demonstrate  the lack of
robustness  of these models.  They show that the results depend crucially on the Cournot assumption10
where each firm selects its optimum level of output taking the output of the other firm as given.
Changing  to a Bertrand  strategy, where  the strategic  variable  is price and not output, reverses  the policy
conclusions  by making an export tax the optimal strategy!  And if the duopolists engage instead in
"consistent"  conjectural  variations,  where each firm's conjectural  variation  is identical  to the actual  policy
responses  of its rivals, then the transfer of rents to the home firm, or profit-shifting,  is impossible  and
free trade becomes  the optimal  policy.
In defence  of their arguments,  Spencer  (1986)  suggests  that inter-firn competition  occurs in three
stages - in R&D, productive  capacity  and marketing. It is only at the last stage that competition  is likely
to be in prices and, therefore, the criticism  of Eaton and Grossman  applies to this last stage only.  For
the first two stages, competition  is in quantities  and hence of the Cournot type.  Spencer, therefore,
argues that there is still a case for targeting  the earlier stages. But as has been  argued  earlier with respect
to the externalities  argument, if policy is to target the earlier stages, the reconmmendation  would be one
of industrial  policy  since  the instruments  required  would  be domestic  instruments;  there would,  therefore,
still be no case for an activist  trade policy.
(b)  Sensitivity  to the Number  of Firms
Dixit (1984) considers a more general Cournot duopoly but one where the home market, and,
therefore, a possible  tradeoff with consumer  surplus, is also involved. He shows  that an export subsidy
is the policy recommendation  only as long as the number of finms is not "too large" and that as the
number  of domestic  firms increases,  the optimal  policy of an export subsidy  is actually reversed. This
is because competition  between  domestic  firms generates  a negative  pecuniary  externality  since each of
the domestic  firms will not take into account  the effects  of its actions  on the profits of the other domestic
competitors  and produces  more than the collusive  outcome. This will reduce  the share of the global rentsI1
that they  jointly bring to the country. With  a sufficiently  large  number  of firtns, the profit-shifting  motive
for a subsidy  is outweighed  by the negative  externality  motive for a tax.
But even for the cases where an export  subsidy  expands  global market  share, the increased  rents
which were presumed  to accrue might be illusionary,  as Horstmaru and Markusen  (1986) argue.  This
is because  export subsidies  lead to inefficient  entry that reduces  an individual  firm's output and pushes
the firm up, rather than down, its average cost curve driving rents to  zero.  The subsidy would,
therefore, not be recaptured,  much less secure excess returns for the producers, and national  welfare
would  be iower than in the free trade situation.
Eaton and Grossman (1986) have also shown that when firm behavior is characterized by
consistent conjectures  and there is more than one domestic firm, then an export tax will always be
optimal. Consistent  conjectures  eliminate  any possibility  of profit-sh,fting;  t,us, the only remaining  factor
in play is the competition  between  domestic firms in third markets  which, as stated above, generates a
negative  pecuniary  externality. A welfare-optimizing  strategy would  be to use an export tax to restrict
exports and exploit the country's monopoly  power in trade more fully - the old optimum  tariff argument
revisited.
(c)  The Size of Excess Profits
Grossman  (1986)  has also questioned  the size of the excess  profits  or rents that oligopolistic  firms
earn.  He argues (p. 57) that "Often what appears  to be an especially  high rate of profit is just a return
to some  earlier, riskier  investment. Research  and development  expenses,  for example,  can be quite large,
and many ventures end in failure.  Firms will undertake these large investments  if they can reap the
benefits  in those instances  where they succeed. Once the market is in operation, we will of course only12
observe  those companies  that have succeeded. We may then be tempted  to conclude  that profit rates are
unusually  high. But industry  profits should  be measured  inclusive  of the losses of those  who never make
it to the marketing  stage".  If profits are not large, then the entire scope of the profit-shifting  argument
as a way of increasing  national  welfare  is considerably  eroded  and an export  subsidy  in such a case would
only create a misallocation  of resources.
(d)  Partial Equilibrium  Analysis
While the econornic  arguments  in support of intervention  have been developed  in the context  of
a partial equilibrium  analysis, partial and general equilibrium results can differ quite radically.  The
export promotion  arguments  are based on models in which there is one oligopolistic  domestic industry
in an otherwise  competitive  economy. When this industry is subsidized, its expansion is effected  by
drawing resources from other uses and where there are no rents to be lost.  But in a general equilibrium
context, some crowding  out of traditional  firms will take place as domestic competition  for the scarce
resources will bid up their market prices and price out the competitive  domestic firms, quite akin to the
allocation effects of the well-known 'Dutch disease' paradigm.  And if  there are several domestic
oligopolies, the gains from rent extraction  in one industry  will be derived, at least in part, by the losses
in rents captured by others.  These will offset the gain in national  welfare from the export subsidy.
In fact, Dixit and Grossman  (1986)  have  shown  that when all the export  industries  are synmmetric
(i.e. face similar demand conditions  in export markets, have similar production  technologies,  and face
similar degrees  of foreign  competition),  then the losses  clearly  outweigh  the gains when any one or more
sector is targeted for subsidization,  and free trade is the optimal  policy.  When the industries  are not
symmetric,  net gains in national  welfare can arise depending  on how much extra profit is shifted  to the
domestic industry  per unit of the scarce resource  expended  in its expansion. This, in turn, depends  upon13
the production  technologies,  both domestic  and foreign,  the degree  of substitution  between  their products,
the price responsiveness  of demand in the export market, and on the nature of  the oligopolistic
competition. This suggests  heavy informational  requirements  for selecting  the industries  to be targeted
which, in practice, is going to be difficult  to meet. Therefore, to ignore intersectoral  shifts in factors  of
production  and the concomitant  changes  in factor prices is to seriously  misspecify  the model.
(e)  Identification  of Market Failure  and Choice of Instrument
It is also difficult to justify trade intervention  on grounds  of increasing  returns to scale.  Since
these are internal  to the firm, the question  arises as to why the firm's own incentives  to exploit its scale
economies  are not consistent  with the social optimum. This is relevant  only in the context  of the second
and third variants of the profit-shifting  argument  as presented  earlier."  As has been argued before, in
Krugmnan's  variant of the profit-shifting  argument, the small size of the market-share  precludes the
attainment  of the scale economies. But size is not relevant  in the modelling  of the second  variant of the
argument. The inability  to achieve  scale economies  there has to lie in market failures arising from the
absence of perfect information. This is because  the theoretical  and unrealistic  artifact of the Coumot
assumption  leads to the abandonment  of perfect foresight. This does not, however, provide for a role
for an export promoting  strategy. The first-best  policy  which achieves  the given objective  with the least
cost in terms of consumer welfare is not trade policy but domestic policy that directly addresses the
domestic  distortion in place.  In this instance, it would  be the public provision  of market information.' 2
In the case of the first variant of the profit-shifting  argument - the rent-extraction  argument -
II/  The first  variant  allows  for the  exploitation  of the  scale  economies  by the  foreign  firm  exporting  to the  domestic
market.  In  fact,  it is the  exploitadon  of  the  economics  which  provides  the  firm  with  oligopoly  power.
12/  This  is, of  course.  premised  on  a presumed  government  supetiority  in doing  so.14
Srinivasan  (1989)  has shown  that the trade policy  prescription  of a tariff is not the first-best  policy  as the
tariff increases  the wedge  between  the price charged  to domestic  consumers  and the marginal  cost of the
foreign  producer. The first-best  policy  is the combination  of an optimally  set lumpsum  tax on the foreign
oligopolist and an equal subsidy  to domestic  consumers.  Such a two-pronged  policy would actually
secure the efficient, competitive  outcome  and does not impose  any cost to society as the subsidy  to the
consumers  would be financed  entirely  by the tax on foreign  oligopolists.
2.  The political economy critique
(a)  Foreien Retaliation
The policy  problems  of the profit-shifting  argument  are compounded  when we bring in political
economy  aspects. Policies  aimed at improving  national  welfare  by securing  excess returns for domestic
firms or by supporting  domestic  industries  can provoke foreign  retaliation  by virtue of their beggar-thy-
neighbor  characteristics.  This has the  unfavorable  result  of leaving  both the countries  worse  off than free,
non-interventionist  trade.  As Bhagwati  (1989) has argued, "such retaliation  is more likely in precisely
the knowledge-intensive  high-tech industries  where economies  of scale relative to world markets are
presumed by the proponents of these new theories to be significant, for these industries  are widely
regarded as important in themselves. Their location  behind one's own borders is supposed  frequently
to be a matter of securing  broader political  and economic  benefits  just as manufacturing  generally  was
regarded  by developing  countries  during the postwar  years. Foreign  government  intervention,  regardless
of whether  profit-shifting-related  advantages  exist or not, is generally  seen therefore  as an attempt  to get
a larger share of this important  pie than is warranted  by legitimate  market forces." The risk of foreign
retaliation may actually be greater for smaller countries who might be singled out for exenplary
retaliation. Note that, as with the optimum  tariff argument, the new trade theory does not purport to15
increase  global welfare  but only to redistribute  it in favor of one's own country. In fact, by moving  away
from a market-determined  allocation  of the gains from trade, it reduces  global welfare.
(b)  Inefficient  Government  Intervention
Moreover,  the  profit-shifting  argument  requires  government  intervention.  But as Bhagwati  (1989)
has argued, governments  may not function  benignly,  as the silent executive  of the welfare maxunizing
economist  (the  puppet  government  assumption),  but rather like autonomous  agents  with objectives  of their
own (self-willed  governmnent  asswnption)  or as a marketplace  for lobbying  activities (the clearinghouse
govermnent  assumption). As soon as the benign role of government  is assumed away, the possibility
arises that government  intervention  may well be welfare-worsening.  The history  of developing  countries
is littered  with proof of misguided  and excessive  government  intervention. Moreover, the informational
requirement  for any goverrnent, and particularly  for developing  country  governments,  to engage in die
selection  of industries  is going to be very huge.  Even otherwise,  there is no reason to suppose  that the
government  will be better able to select 'winmers'  than the private sector.
(c)  Capture  of Policy  by Special  Interests
Arguments  for govermnent  intervention  also ignore the possibility  of the capture of policy by
special  interests. When  making  microeconomic  interventions.  governments  are necessarily  influenced  by
snall, special interest groups who stand to gain by large anounts.  The costs, on the other hand, are
borne by large, diffuse groups  who don't have all the information  regarding  the policy.  Consequently,
policy intervention tends to  be excessive or  misguided.  Recourse to  political and  bureaucratic
imperatives,  rather than to economic  viability, in making economic  decisions  is necessarily a welfare-
worsening  course.16
(d)  Moral Hazard Problem
Moreover, there is an inherent  moral  hazard  problem  in governments  providing  subsidies  to firms
in order to credibly  commit  them to an aggressive  policy. Domestic  finns may well find higher retuns
to subsidy-seeking  than to aggressive  behavior  which will only foster dependency  and serve to entrench
the subsidies. Such subsidy-seeking  belongs to the genre of distortion-triggered  directly unproductive,
profit-seeking  activities  (DUPs).'3
(e)  Inimical  Redistributive  Effects
Another  political  economic  argument  arises from  the general  proposition  that even  Pareto-efficient
interventions  have inevitable, and possibly  inimical, redistributive  effects.  Export subsidies  will serve
to transfer income to the owne,-s  and employees  of the 'protected' industries  from the rest of society.
Since the industries  suggested for export  promotion  are typically  the high-tech  industries,  such income
transfers will manifest themselves  either in wage increases  for the already employed,  well-paid, highly
skilled workers,  or in increased  above-normal  profits to shareholders. Related  to this is another general
proposition  of how the subsidies  are going  to be financed  and of the possible  distortionary  effects  of such
financing. Both of these make the attainment  of an efficient economic  rate of return on the subsidy  a
more difficult  and uncertain  task.
The above criticisms  severely undermine  the utility of the new trade theory and question its
validity  as a basis for policy formulation.  These apply generally to both developed and developing
countries. In fact, the political economy  arguments  against  the new trade theory  gain greater potency in
the context of the developing countries.  For instance, the possibility  that the trade strategy will be
captured by special interests is even more relevant  for the developing  countries  because  (i) rent-seeking
13/  See Bbagwati  (1982).17
and DUP activities  are more pernicious,  (ii) the political  institutions  are more fragile and therefore more
susceptible  to bending  under such pressures, and (iii) institutional  arrangements  are weaker than in the
developed countries.  Moreover, the record of government intervention in developing countries is
especially  poor.  Since the informational  requirement  for any government  to engage in the selection  of
industries  for trade intervention  a la the new trade theory is particularly  huge, this suggests that any
excursion  along  this route is going to be singularly  inefficient  and welfare-worsening.
But some may still see, in the rent extraction argument and the import-protection-as-export-
promotion argument, not only validity but also special relevance to the developing countries.  The
following  section, therefore, analyzes its relevance to the developing countries in  the light of the
identifying  features  of such  economnies  and ignoring  the above  economic  and political  economy  criticisms.
It shows that even these two special insights of the new trade theory are not of any relevance  to the
developing  countries.
C.  THE NEW TRADE THEORY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
It is not clear that the crucial market and technological  characteristics  on which the new trade
theory builds are identifying  features  of developing  country  econornies. These are questions  of market
structure, economic  size, and the technological  character  of exports. There is also the additional  issue
of the extent of the gains from trade liberalization  in an imperfectly  competitive  world and, therefore,
whether  the policy  prescription  for trade liberalization  that is rendered  from the competitive  neoclassical
model is reversed  or reinforced  by the new modelling.18
1.  Market Structwe
Rodrik (1989) provides evidence from the literature  on the high four-firm  concentration  ratios
in developing  countries' industries  relative  to those in the developed  countries  and argues  that "imperfect
competition  is in fact more pervasive in the industrial sectors of the developing  countries than of the
developed  ones"."  Even if we accept, in the absence of a better statistic,  the high concentration  ratios
as suggestive  of an oligopolistic  market  structure, the reasons  for such a structure  are quite  different  from
the Increasing-returns-to-scale  characteristic  which Is at the heart of the theoretical  modelling  of the new
trade theory. For instance, capital market imperfections,  cultural  factors,  or government  policies  could
have led to oligopolistic  markets in developing  countries. In particular, the import-substitution  policies
pursued  by developing  countries  for much of the postwar  era kept foreign  competitive  pressures  at bay,
and induced  excess  domestic  capacity  through  instruments  such as import  quotas. Since  these were issued
on the basis of production  capacity, they were biased towards large-scale  production. Simultaneously,
the entry of new firms, who would  have been  attracted  by the supernormal  profits, and the growth  of the
industry itself was restricted  by licensing  requirements. Developing  countries  also share a general lack
14/  Rodrik  (1989, Table  5.  1) provides  the  following  four-firn concentration  ratios  in industry  citing  other  original  sources.
Comprnpon  of Four-Firm  Concentraion  Ratios  in Industry
Unweighted  Average  of Four-Firm
Country  Year  Concentration  Ratios  (%)  Number  of Industries
Brazil  1972  72  68
Chile  1979  50  41
India  1968  55  22
Mcxico  1972  73  73
Pakistan  1968  66  51
Turkey  1976  67  125
U.S.  1972  40  323
France  1969  28  48
These  figures  are  not  strictly  comparable  since  the  averages  are  calculated  at  different  levels  of disaggregation  of  the  industries.
These ratios are  also  based  on different  existing  levels  of protection  and  are  not  truly indicatve  of the  structural  characteristics
of these  economies.19
of antitrust policies or of their implementation. In addition, in the context of planned economies, the
requirements for a  central gathering of information, its processing, and the final dissemination  of
instructions  to individual  enterprises  put limitations  on the number  of enterprises  within  each industry  so
as to make the system manageable.' 5 There is also, in any case, inconsistent  incentives  between those
who want information  and those who have to reveal i,.
In fact, there is no strong evidence  that increasing  returns  to scale are responsible  for this market
structure.  An anecdotal  evidence  of the scope of scale economies,  which is often cited, is that of the
automobile  industry.  It is generally  believed, from studies of developed  countries, that the minimum
efficient  scale of production is in the range of 200,000-300,000  cars per model per annum."1  But most
developing countries have average production runs of only around 20,000 imnplying  the presence of
unexploited  scale economies.'  These studies, however, do not take into account the less capital-
intensive  and low technology  techniques  of production,  the reduced expenditures  on R&D, advertising
and marketing, and the long life of each model. Nor have the economies  of scale inherent in some of
the heavy  capital-intensive  industries  manifested  themselves  in national  comparative  advantage  in those
industries  as the scale of output increased. In fact, calculations  of the domestic  resource costs of these
industries  have found them to be higher  than the exchange  rate (i.e., the domestic resources utilized  to
produce a dollar's worth of import-substitutes  have  been higher than the domestic  resources utilized for
a dollar's worth of imnports).  Moreover, the extent  of the scale  economies  depends fundamentally  on the
technology  of production  which in the developing  countries  with their advantage  in lower labor costs is
IS/  Newberry.  D.M. and Kamuman,  P. in  Market  Concentfaion  and Competition  in Eastern  Europe', The World
Economy,  Vol.  15,  No.3,  May  1992,  provide  figures  from  1988  to  show  that  'enterprises  in  the  Soviet-type  economies  are  more
than  ten  times  the  average  size  of those  in  the  developed  market  economies'.
16/  See  Owen  (1983).  table  4.12.
17/  See  Rodrik  (1989).  table  5.2.20
biased in favor of labor-intensive  techniques of production.  Some evidence of this is presented in
Krueger (1975) in her study of the Indian  automobile  industry. The manufacturers  she interviewed  did
not believe  that there were any significant  economies  of scale to be exploited.
The crucial question with respect to the relevance  of the new trade modelling  to developing
countries is not whether  the markets  are merely  oligopolistic  but whether  the oligopolistic  characteristics
derive from economies  of scale.  After all, it is the economies  of scale that enable an oligopolistic  firm
to reduce average costs sufficiently,  as the scale of output  increases,  and thereby capture a larger share
of the global profits.  The evidence  from the developing  world on this count is clearly in the negative.
2.  Economk Sirz
The small size of developing  country  markets  makes  strategic  trade policy irrelevant  on several
grounds. First, the small size of domestic  markets  precludes  the exploitation  of scale economies  in the
domestic market making Krugman's import-protection-as-export-promotion  argument irrelevant.
Second, as Krugman (1989) has argued, small size reduces the ability of developing  country
governments  to play strategic games.  This will be so because small countries are not typically the
repositories  of the global  industries  the capture  of whose  rents through strategic  games  is the focus  of the
new trade theory. And even if such global industries  were based in a small country,  the small size itself
will severely  detract from the ability  of the country  to act as a credible  first-mover.
Third, because of their small size, developing  countries  stand to attract and, therefore, to lose
more from foreign  retaliation. Whatever  might be said of the argument  that their small size will actually
induce the larger countries  to be more concessionary  as the cost to them will be small, and that they will21
be less likely to retaliate  for the  same reasons,  history is  proof of the trampling  of the weak by the strong.
In this context, note the tremendous  increase in countervailing  duties by the developed  larger countries
during the 1970s  and 1980s  that were imposed  against the developing  smaller countries and the more
recent backtracking  by the U.S. on its thrcat of punitive trade restrictions  oat  (large) EC in the dispute
over public procurement  policies.  The case, therefore, is quite strong that smaller countries will be
singled  out by the larger countries  for exemplary  retaliation  (i.e. to set an example  for others) not omiy
because the loss from trade restrictions  would be very small for them but also because the risks of
retaliating against a  larger country - a  'peer'  - could elicit a trade war which would be mutually
devastating. Retaliation  is also more credible  against  smaller countries. But any retaliation  would be
particularly  disastrous  for the developing  countries  because  of their  greater need for foreign  market access
(for faster growth) given the small  size of their own markets.
3.  Technoloflcal Character of Exports
Developing  countries' exports,  reflecting  their comparative  advantage,  are typically  resource-  and
labor-intensive  the technology  of which is rarely subject  to increasing  returns to scale. Table I provides
the structure of developing  countries' exports for 1989.  Almost two-thirds of their exports of both
primary products and manufactures  are to the developed  countries.  Developing  countries' exports of
primary  products  were $307  billion  out of total merchandize  exports of $655  billion or 47 percent of their
total merchandize exports."S Much of their exports of manufactures  are also labor-intensive  which
further reduces  the role of possible  economies  of scale.
Moreover, as exporters  of manufactures,  the developing  countries are only small players.  In
1989, their share of the world exports of manufactures  overall was a dismal 14 percent but their share
of world  exports of primary products  was 33 percent  compared  to 79 percent  and 51 percent  respectively
18/  For the developeu  countries. the  equivalent  share of primary  products in total merchandize  exports is 19 percent.22
for the developed  countries. The exporters  of manufactures  are also concentrated  among  a few countries,
primarily  in East Asia but they, too, do not have global monopoly  power.
Developing  countries  also  do not export  the high-technology  goods  the knowledge  spillovers  from
whose  R&D activity  has been cited in strategic  trade theory literature  as the most compelling  reason for
intervention.'4 Table 2 presents the shares of world high-technology  exports over  1970-89.  The
developing  countries  which fall  under the category  'others' exported,  at most, only 6 percent  of the world
exports  of high-technology  products  in 1988-89. Since  the developing  countries' comparative  advantage
does not lie in high-technology  industries,  their scope for shifting  global profits to themselves  is severely
limited.
Krugman  (1989) acknowledges  that the technological  character of developing  countries' exports
do not conform  to the requiremens of the new trade theory  models,  but he argues that increasing  returns
to scale (arising  from large indivisible  expenditures)  in the provision  of export  infrastructure  for primary
products, like ports, warehouses,  and transportation  facilities,  may allow  for first-mover  advantages,  and
hence  for the strategic  use of trade policy,  even  though the production  of primary  products  may not itself
be subject  to increasing  returns to scale. He argues that even an infinitesimally  small  investment  subsidy
can be sufficient  to provide  comparative  advantage  in the absence  of an activist  policy  by other countries.
But there is no empirical evidence  that either the provision of export infrastructure  has a minimum
efficient  scale of production  too large for a small country  or that the resulting  economies  of scale are so
significant,  relative to the size of the world market for these products, that they impinge  on a country's
19/  See e.g. Tyson (1992) who defines  a high-technology  industry  as  "one in which knowledge  is a prime source of
competitive  advantage  for producers,  who in turn make large investments  in knowledge  creation' (pp.18).  In general, such
industries  are chemicals  and pharmaceuticals,  electrical  machinery,  electronic and telecommunications  equipment,  scientific
instruments,  and aerospace. See Tyson's listing  of alternative  classifications  in Table 2.1 of Tyson (I1  ), pp. 20-21.23
Table I
Developing  Countries'  Morchandize  Export. by Detination and Product  (1989)
(Percbentge  of world)
World$
(S  bilons)  Developed  Developing
Countries  Countrhi
Food  84  64.3  22.6
Raw Materials  26  57.7  30.8
Ores  & Minerals  18  72.2  16.7
Fuels  163  68.1  29.5
Non-Ferrous  Metals  16  68.8  31.3
Pruarby  Products  307  66.1  27.0
Iron and Steel  15  53.3  33.3
Chemicals  26  38.5  50.0
Other semi-nmanufactures  40  70.0  25.0
Machinery  & Trans. eq.  131  64.9  29.8
Textiles  30  33.3  46.7
Clothing  44  90.9  6.8
Other  Consumer  Goods  54  77.8  16.7
Manufactures  359  62.4  25.6
Tota  65S  "f.I  27.2
Includes  destinations  to centrally  planned  economies  which  the GATT places
outside  of the countries  labelled  as developed  and developing. Hence  the sum of
the percentages  will not add up to hundred.
Source: International  Trade 1990-91,  GATT.
Table  2
Shares  of World Higb-Teebnology  Export (%)
1970-89
Country  1970-73  1973-76  1976-79  1979-82  1982-85  198547  1918689
OECD  95.57  93.93  91.52  88.79  86.80  85.30  83.64
NIC  1.30  2.28  3.18  4.06  6.05  7.56  8.76
Others  2.69  3.36  4.43  5.23  5.98  61.4  6.27
NICs  = newly industrialized  countries  of Hong Kong. Korea, Singapore  and Taiwan.
Sourwce:  Extracted  from Table  2.3 of Tyson  (1992). Refer  to orig4n sources  cited  therein.24
decision  to export.  The latter, if true, would  actually  suggest  that trade patterns are not determined  by
product comparative  advantage  but rather by the economies  of scale in export infrastructure  linkagesl
Moreover, the primary source for increasing  returns to scale would seem to lie in the nature of the
technology of production, like in the high capital costs and R&D expenditures of high technology
industries,  rather than in export infrastructure  linkages.
4.  Gains from Trade LiberaUzation
While the case for an activist trade policy in developing  countries inspired by the new trade
theory  argu,nents  is seriously  eroded  by the above  arguments,  the conventional  wisdom  of adopting  a free
trade policy is simultaneously  reinforced  by an imperfectly  competitive  world. Calculations  of the gains
from trade -the conventional  "triangles"  -based  on the competitive  neoclassical  model  provided  numbers
in the order of 0.5 to 2 percent of GNP.  But Harris (1984) has estimated  the static long-run gains to
trade to Canada in an imperfectly  competitive  model to be a much higher 8-12 percent.  Richardson's
(1989)  survey of empirical  work concludes  that, in imperfectly  competitive  markets,  trade liberalization,
rather than policy intervention  to promote domestic producers, leads to gains from trade two to three
times larger than those under perfect competition.20 These results strengthen the case for trade
liberalization  and may be the only item of relevance for developing countries.  This is particularly
important  since the new trade theory was alleged to undermine  the neoclassical  prescription for trade
liberalization  which  many developing  countries  had begun to follow  since the eighties  after weltering  for
decades  iniprotectionist  policies.
20/  According  to  Trefler  (1993),  these  estimates  are  biased  downwards  as  dhey  consider  trade  libenlization  as  an  exogeou
variable  when.  in fact,  it is endogenous.  By  treating  the  level  of protection  endogenously,  he  has  shown  tat  its retrictive
impact  on U.S. imports  in 1983  was  10  dtmes  the  estimate  derived  from treadng  the level  of protection  exogenously.  This,
therefore,  opens  up the  possibility  of even  larger  gains  from  trade  liberalization  than  those  estimated.25
D.  CONCLUSIONS
The new  trade  theory incorporates  models  of imperfect  competition  and increasing  returns  to scale
in trade theory. The role for active government  intervention  that economic  analysts  and policymakers
find in it has been  shown in the paper to be an illusion  and most of the major propositions  of the theory
to be readily  understood  in the context  of the neoclassical  trade theory.
Economists  do not yet fully understand  how  oligopolists  behave  and compete. Consequently,  any
modelling  of oligopolistic  behavior  necessarily  tends to be extremely  restrictive  and of limited  application.
It  is, therefore, not surprising that the new modelling  of international  trade based on oligopolistic
behavior lacks theoretical robustness  and is particularly sensitive to assumptions about competitive
behavior  and the number  of firms. Other economic  criticisms  relate to the size of the excess profits that
oligopolistic  firms are alleged  to earn, the partial  equilibrium  nature  of the analysis,  and the identification
of the market failure  and the choice  of instrument. Moreover,  the normative  prescriptions  that arise from
it are subject to a host of politicai economy criticisms  based on the potential for foreign retaliation,
inefficient  government  intervention,  capture of policy by special interests, moral hazard problem, and
possible inimical redistributive  effects.  These criticisms  severely undermine the applicability  of these
models for any country.
The limitations  of the new trade theory are particularly  acute for the developing  countries,  given
their small  economic  size, the limited  scope for profit-shifting,  the nature of their trade, and the enhanced
possibilities  for the capture of trade policy by special interests. It is after an aeon of lost opportunities
and misguided  government  interventions  that developing  countries are emerging as significant  trading
players in the international  arena; their future  should  not be compromised  so soon  by a reversion  to past26
policies.
Paradoxically,  and interestingly,  the only point  of relevance  of the new trade theory  to developing
countries  that does emerge lies in the strengthening  of the case for trade liberalization  and, therefore, for
a reduced  role for government  in trade policy.27
References
Bhagwati,  J.N.,  1993, "Rough  Trade", The  New Republic, May 31, pp. 35-40.
1991, The World  Trading  System at Risk, Princeton:  Princeton University  Press.
--  1989, "Is Free Trade Pass6 after All?", Weltwirtschaffliches  Archlv.
--  1982. "Directly unproductive,  profit-seeking  (DUP) activities". Journal of Politcal Economy,
Vol.90, October,  pp.988-1002.
- 1971, "The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfareu in J.Bhagwati et al (eds) Trade,
Growth and  the  Balance of  Payments, Essays in  Honour of  Gottfried Haberler, Chicago and
Amsterdarn:Rand-McNally  and North Holland.
- , V. Ramaswami,  and T.N. Srindvasan,  1969, "Domestic  Distortions,  Tariffs and the Theory of
Optimum  Subsidy: Some Further Results",  Journal of Political  Economy,  77, pp. 1005-10
Brander, J. and Barbara Spencer, 1985, 'Export Subsidies  and International  Market Share Rivalry",
Journal of International  Economics, 18, pp. 83-100.
1981, "Tariffs  and the Extraction  of Foreign Monopoly  Rents under Potential Entry", Canadian
Journal  of Economics,  14, pp. 371-89.
Corden, W.M., 1990, "Strategic  Trade Policy: How New? How Sensible?",  Working  Paper Series No.
396, The World Bank. Washington,  D.C.
- 1974, Trade  Policy and Economic  Welfare,  Oxford: OAcford  University  Press.
Deardorff,  A. and R. Stern, 1987, "Current  Issues in trade Policy: An Overview" in R. Stern (ed) U.S.
Trade  Policies  in a Changing  World  Econony, Cambridge, MIT Press.
Dixit, Avinash  K.,  1984, "Trade Policy for Oligopolistic  Industries", Economic  Journal, Supplement,
94, pp.1-16.
- and Gene  M. Grossman,  1986,  "Targeted  Export  Promotion  with Several  Oligopolistic  Industries",
Journal of International  Economics,  Vol.21, pp.233-249.
Eaton, J.  and Gene M. Grossman, 1986, "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly",
Quarterly  Journal of Economics,  Vol. 2. pp.383-406.
Grossman,  Gene M.,  1986, "Strategic  Export Promotion:  A Critique" in Paul Krugman ad. Strategic
Trade  Policy wnd  the New International  Economics,  Cambridge, Mass.
Grubel, Herbert G.,  1966, "The Anatomy of Classical and Modem Infant Industry Arguments",
Weltwirtschaffliches  Archiv, Band XCVII.28
Harris,  R.,  1984, "Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of  Small Open Economies with Scale
Econornies  and Imperfect  Competition",  American  Economic  Review, Vol.74, No.5, pp.1016-33.
Horstnann, I.J. and J.R. Marlusen, 1986, "Up the Average  Cost Curve: Inefficient  Entry and the New
Protectionism",  Journal of International  Economics,  Vol. 20, pp.225-247.
Krueger, Anne O., 1975, The Benefits  and Costs  of Import-Subsitution  in India:  A Microeconomic  Study,
University  of Minnesota  Press, Minneapolis.
Krugrnan,  P., 1989, "New  Trade Theory  and the Less Developed  Countries"  in G. Calvo  et al ed., Debt,
Stabilization  and Development,  Essays  in Memory  of Carlos  Diaz-Alejandro,  Basil  Blackwell.
- 1987, "Is Free Trade Passe?", Economic  Perspectives,  Vol. 1, No.2, pp.131-144.
- 1984, "Import Protection as Export Promotion: International  Comnpetition  in the Presence of
Oligopoly and  Economies of  Scale" in  Henryk Kierzkowski ed.,  Monopolisdc Compeddon and
International  Trade, Oxford: Clarendon  Press.
Owen, N.,  1983, Economies of  Scale, Competitiveness,  and Trade Patterns within the European
Community,  Oxford: Clarendon  Press.
Pursell, G. and R.H. Snape, 1973, "Economies  of Scale, Price Discrimination  and Exporting",  Journal
of International  Economics,  vol. 3, pp 85-92.
Richardson,  J.D.,  1989, "Empirical  Research  on Trade Liberalization  with Imperfect  Competidon:  A
Survey", OECD  Economic  Studies, No. 12.
Rodrik, Dani,  1989, "Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in  Developing
Countries", in R.E Baldwin  ed.  Trade  Policy Issues and Empirical  Analysis, Chicago: University  of
Chicago Press.
Spencer,  B., 1986, "What Should  Trade Policy  Target" in Krugman  ed. Strategic  Trade Policy  and the
New International  Economics,  MIT Press.
Srinivasan, T.N.,  1989, "Recent Theories of Imperfect Competition  and International  Trade: Any
Implications  for Development  Strategy?",  Indian Economic  Review, Vol.24, No.1, pg. 1-23
Trefler, D.,  1993, "Trade Liberalization  and the Theory of Endogenous  Protection:  An Econometric
Study of U.S. Import Policy", Journal of Political  Econony, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 138-160.
Tyson, L.  , 1992, Who's Bashing Whom?  Trade Conflict  in High Technology  Industries, Washington,
D.C.A:nstitute  for International  Economics.Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  249 Competitiveness  and  Environmental  Piritta  Sorsa  February  1994  P.  Kokila
Standards:  Some  Exploratory  Results  33716
WPS1250  Explaining  Miracles:  Growth  William  Easterly  February  1994  R.  Martin
Regressions  Meet  the  Gang  of  Four  39026
WPS1251  Excise  Taxes  John  F.  Due  February  1994  C. Jones
37699
WPS1252  On  the  Dangers  of  Decentralization  R6my  Prud'homme  February  1994  TWUTD
31005
WPS1253  Can  Competition  Policy  Control  301  ?  J. Michael  Finger  February  1994  M.  Patena
K.  C.  Fung  37947
WPS1  254 What  Are  OECD  Trade  Preferences Alexander  J. Yeats  February  1994  J. Jacobson
Worth  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa?  33710
WPS1  255 Intrahousehold  Resource  Allocation:  Lawrence  Haddad  February  1994  P.  Cook
An  Overview  John  Hoddinott  33902
Harold  Alderman
WPS1256  World  Fossil  Fuel  Subsidies  and  Bjorn  Larsen  February  1994  C. Jones
Global  Carbon  Emissions  in  a Model  37699
with  Interfuel  Substitution
WPS1257  Old-Age  Security  in  Transitional  Louise  Fox  February  1994  E.  Vincent
Economies  82350
WPS1258  Decentralizing  Infrastructure:  Richard  Bird  February  1994  WDR
For  Good  or  for  III?  31393
WPS1259  The  Reform  of  Fiscal  Systems  in  Robin  Boadway  February  1994  C. Jones
Developing  and  Emerging  Market  Sandra  Roberts  37754
Economies:  A Federalism  Perspective  Anwar  Shah
WPS1260  When  Is  a Lffe  Too  Costly  to  Save?  George  L.  Van  Houtven  February  1994  A.  Maranon
Evidence  from  U.S.  Environmental Maureen  L Cropper  39074
Regulations
WPS1261  A Political-Economy  Analysis  of  Arvind  Panagariya  March  1994  N. Artis
Free  Trade  Areas  and  Customs  Ronald  Findlay  37947
Unions
WPS1262  Flexibility  in Sri  Lanka's  Labor  Market  Martin  Rama  March  1994  P.  Cook
33902
WPS1263  The  Effects  of Barriers  on  Equity  Stijn  Claessens  March  1994  F.  Hatab
Investment  in  Developing  Countries Moon-Whoan  Rhee  35835Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1264 A Rock  and a Hard  Place:  The  Two  J. Michael  Finger  March  1994  M. Patefna
Faces  of U.S.  Trade  Policy  Toward  37947
Korea
WPS1265  Parallel  Exchange  Rates  in  Miguel  A. Kiguel  March  1994  R. Luz
Developing  Countries:  Lessons  from  Stephen  A. O'Connell  34303
Eight  Case  Studies
WPS1266 An Efficient  Frontier  for International  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan  March  1994  D. Gustafson
Portfolios  with Commodity  Assets  Panos  Varangis  33732
WPS1267  The  Tax Base  in Transition:  The  Case Zeliko  Bogetic  March  1994  F. Smith
of Bulgaria  Arye  L Hillman  36072
WPS1268  The  Reform  of Mechanisms  for  Eliana  La Ferrara  March  1994  N. Artis
Foreign  Exchange  Allocation:  Theory  Gabriel  Castillo  38010
and Lessons  from Sub-Saharan  John  Nash
Africa
WPS1269  Union-Nonunion  Wage  Differentials  Alexis  Panagides  March  1994  I. Conachy
in the Developing  World:  A Case  Harry  Anthony  Patrinos  33669
Study  of Mexico
WPS1270  How Land-Based  Targeting  Affects  Martin  Ravallion  March  1994  P. Cook
Rural  Poverty  Binayak  Sen  33902
WPS1271  Measuring  the Effect  of External  F. Desmond  McCarthy  March  1994  M. Divino
Shocks  and the Policy  Response  to  J. Peter  Neary  33739
Them:  Empirical  Methodology  Applied Giovanni  Zanalda
to the Philippines
WPS1272  The  Value  of Superfund  Cleanups:  Shreekant  Gupta  March  1994  A. Maranon
Evidence  from U.S.  Environmental  George  Van  Houtven  39074
Protection  Agency  Decisions  Maureen  L Cropper
WPS1273  Desired  Fertility  and  the Impact  of  Lant  H. Pritchett  March  1994  P. Cook
Population  Policies  Lawrence  H. Summers  33902
WPS1274  The  New  Trade  Theory  and  Its  Asad  Alam  March  1994  A.  Alam
Relevance  for Developing  Countries  87380
WPS1275 Female-Headed  Households,  Ricardo  Barros  March  1994  K. Binkley
Poverty,  and  the Welfare  of Children  Louise  Fox  81143
in Urban  Brazil